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ADJUDICATORS, NOT LEGISLATORS: ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
DECLINES OPPORTUNITY TO “BREATHE FURTHER LIFE” 
INTO § 212(c) DEPORTATION RELIEF 
 
De la Rosa v. U.S. Attorney General, 579 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(per curiam) 
Andres Healy* 
As a boy, De la Rosa had come to the United States from the 
Dominican Republic in search of a better life.1 Over the next twenty years, 
he built that life.2 Now, as a man, he asked for only one thing–the 
opportunity to stay.3 
De la Rosa’ s troubles began in 1995 when, as a twenty-two-year-old,4 
he pled nolo contendere to charges of committing a lewd act upon a child 
under the age of sixteen–an aggravated felony.5 Besides the usual criminal 
consequences, his conviction had a critical effect: it rendered De la Rosa a 
removable alien, subject to deportation at any time.6 For over a decade, the 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Expected 2010, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. in journalism, 
University of Central Florida. I would like to thank Professor Lea Johnston for never failing to have 
the right answer and Professor Michael Seigel for giving me the opportunity to make some great 
friends. I would also like to thank my wonderful Natalie for being my better half. Finally, I would 
like to thank my mother. I would not be the man I am today without your love, patience and 
guidance. You inspire me every day. I hope I can continue to make you proud. 
 1. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), ICE Fugitive 
Operations Teams Arrest More Than 45 Fugitives and Immigration Violators in Orange and Palm 
Beach Counties (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0808/080825miami.htm. De 
la Rosa had lived in the United States since 1989 when he emigrated from the Dominican Republic. 
Id. 
 2. See De la Rosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 579 F.3d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. At the time of De la Rosa’s conviction, Fla. Stat. § 800.04(3) (1993) stated: 
A person who: 
(1) Handles, fondles, or assaults any child under the age of 16 years in a lewd, 
lascivious, or indecent manner; 
(2) Commits actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, 
sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, actual lewd exhibition of 
the genitals, or any act or conduct which simulates that sexual battery is being or 
will be committed upon any child under the age of 16 years or forces or entices the 
child to commit any such act; 
(3) Commits an act defined as sexual battery under s. 794.011(1)(h) upon any 
child under the age of 16 years; or 
(4) Knowingly commits any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any child 
under the age of 16 years, without committing the crime of sexual battery, 
commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 
775.083, or s. 775.084. Neither the victim’s lack of chastity nor the victim’s 
consent is a defense to the crime proscribed by this section. A mother’s 
breastfeeding of her baby does not under any circumstance violate this section. 
 6. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1328. See generally Natalie Liem, Note, Mean What You Say, 
Say What You Mean: Defining the Aggravated Felony Deportation Grounds to Target More than 
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government never exercised this option.7 I  2007, however, De la Rosa’ s 
free pass came to an end.8 As part of a concerted crack down on deportable 
aliens,9 immigration officials, citing De la Rosa’ s conviction, ordered De 
la Rosa to show cause as to why he should not be immediately deported.10 
Appearing before an immigration judge, De la Rosa sought the only relief 
available to him–a “§ 212(c) waiver” of deportation.11 
An individual seeking a § 212(c) waiver does not contest his 
deportability,12 but must, in fact,concede his deportability at the outset.13 
Eligibility further depends on whether the individual can demonstrate that 
he satisfies specific statutory criteria. Notably, this includes demonstrating 
that the basis for his deportation has a statutory counterpart in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a), which describes those conditions that render aliens seeking 
entry into the United States inadmissible.14 Notably, even if determined 
eligible, an applicant is by no means guaranteed relief. He must still throw 
himself at the mercy of the Attorney General, which is exercised by 
immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),15 and 
                                                                                                                     
Aggravated Felons, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1071 (2007) (discussing generally the varying effects of such 
convictions on an alien’s immigration status). 
 7. See Press Release, supra note 1. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Jason Schultz, Immigration Sweep Nets 44 Targeted for Deportation, PALM BEACH POST, 
Aug. 25, 2008. ICE arrested De la Rosa as a part of its Fugitive Operations Program, which “was 
established in 2003 to eliminate the nation’s backlog of immigration fugitives and ensure that 
deportation orders handed down by immigration judges are enforced.” Id. 
 10. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1328. See generally Stephen Yale-Loehr & Lindsay 
Schoonmaker, Overview of U.S. Immigration Law, 1.13.2 Removal Procedures, 1727 PLI/Corp 73 
(2009) (“All removal proceedings begin with a notice to appear. This is similar to the old orders to 
show cause. The notice to appear indicates the reasons the government believes the foreign national 
is inadmissible or deportable, and the time and place of hearing before an immigration judge.”). 
 11. INA § 212 (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (c) (1994) (repealed 1996). The section provided in 
pertinent part that: 
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded 
abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to 
a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in 
the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provisions of 
subsection (a) of this section (other than paragraphs (3) and (9)(C)). Nothing 
contained in this subsection shall limit the authority of the Attorney General to 
exercise the discretion vested in him under section 1181(b) of this title. The first 
sentence of this subsection shall not apply to an alien who has been convicted of 
one or more aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term 
of imprisonment of at least 5 years. 
Id. In effect, the § 212(c) waiver allowed the Attorney General to waive what would otherwise 
amount to automatic denials of readmission into the United States. Se  id. 
 12. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44 (2008). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(e) (2008). 
 15. The BIA wields appellate jurisdiction and also operates as a court of final appeal over 
nearly all matters, except those referred to the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2009). 
2
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ask for a discretionary waiver of deportation.16 
For De la Rosa, even that opportunity would not be forthcoming.17 The 
government moved to “pretermit”18 De la Rosa’ s application for relief, 
arguing that the category of his aggravated felony conviction rendered him 
ineligible for a waiver.19  The immigration judge agreed and ordered De la 
Rosa removed from the United States.20 De la Rosa appealed to the BIA.21 
He argued that his conviction did not disqualify him from a § 212(c) 
waiver, because “his aggravated felony conviction constituted a ‘ crime 
involving moral turpitude’ ”—a category of convictions eligible for waiver 
pursuant to § 1182(a).22 The BIA was not persuaded.23 It concluded that 
the proper test for eligibility was whether the category of De la Rosa’ s 
actual charge—sexual abuse of a minor24—had a statutory counterpart in 
§ 1182(a).25 It refused to consider whether any aspect of his underlying 
crime could have been charged in a manner entitling him to relief and 
dismissed his claim.26 
De la Rosa appealed yet again, this time to the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals.27 He reiterated his complaint that immigration courts erred by 
focusing strictly on the category of his charged offense rather than 
considering whether his underlying crime could be considered a crime 
involving moral turpitude.28 Analyzing De la Rosa’ s claim,29 the court first 
explained the tortured history of the § 212(c) waiver.30 As originally 
                                                                                                                     
 16. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(e). 
 17. De la Rosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 579 F.3d 1327, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 18. “Pretermit” means “to ignore or disregard purposefully.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 559 
(8th ed. 2004). 
 19. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1328 (arguing that the BIA’s decision in In re Blake, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 2005), foreclosed the granting of any waiver). 
 20. Id. at 1328. Jason Schultz, Immigration Sweep Nets 44 Targeted for Deportation, PALM 
BEACH POST, Aug. 25, 2008. 
 21. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1328–29. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 1329. 
 24. Id. at 1340. 
 25. Id. at 1329. 
 26. Id.  
 27. See id.  
 28. Id. at 1328. 
 29.  Describing De la Rosa’s claims as “constitutional and legal in nature,” the court 
determined that it had jurisdiction to review his case. Id. at 1328 n.1. Such a finding was necessary 
in light of the REAL ID Act of 2005, which substantially limited the availability of habeas review 
of alien removal orders. Jennifer Norako, Comment, Accuracy or Fairness?: The Meaning of 
Habeas Corpus After Boumediene v. Bush and Its Implications on Alien Removal Orders, 58 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1611, 1621–23 (2009); see REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 
§ 106(a)(1)(B)(5), 119 Stat. 231 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Review of 
alien removal orders by courts of appeals is now limited strictly to constitutional and legal claims 
and must be sought within thirty days of a BIA decision. Norako, supra, at 1621–23. Additionally, 
courts of appeals are confined to reviewing the administrative record and prohibited from hearing 
new evidence. Id.  
 30. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1329–35. 
3
Healy: Adjudicators, Not Legislators: Eleventh Circuit Declines Opportun
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
562 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
enacted, relief could be sought only by individuals denied entry into the 
United States.31 The statute provided no basis for application to aliens 
present and facing deportation.32 This distinction rendered those aliens 
subject to deportation eligible for a waiver if they first voluntarily left the 
country, but provided no recourse for aliens actually deported on the basis 
of identical charges.33 This disparity did not linger long.34 Concluding that 
the statutory distinction was “not rationally related to any legitimate 
purpose of the statute,” the Second Circuit determined in Fra cis v. INS35 
that § 212(c) relief should be available to any alien who otherwise met the 
statutory criteria,36 regardless of whether that individual faced deportation 
or denial of admission.37 Accepting this constitutional imperative, the BIA 
formulated the “statutory counterpart” test.38 Pursuant to this test, a 
deportable alien was eligible for a waiver if the “ground of deportation 
charged is also a ground of inadmissibility.”39 This standard eventually 
was codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2004).40 
Even codified, however, the standard by which § 212(c) waivers 
applied to deportees remained largely an open question.41 The BIA 
previously determined that, pursuant to the regulation, a categorical 
approach should be employed to determine whether the statutory 
counterpart test was met.42 Under this approach, “whether a ground of 
deportation or removal has a statutory counterpart in the provisions for 
exclusion or inadmissibility turns on whether Congress has employed 
similar language to describe substantially equivalent categories of 
offenses.”43 Notably, to exemplify this standard, the BIA stated:  
Although many firearms offenses may also be crimes of 
moral turpitude, the category of firearms offenses is not a 
statutory counterpart to crimes of moral turpitude. Similarly, 
although there may be considerable overlap between offenses 
categorized as sexual abuse of a minor and those considered 
crimes of moral turpitude, these two categories of offenses 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Id.; see also INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996).  
 32. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1329–30; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).  
 33. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1329–30 (quoting Farquharson v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 246 F.3d 
1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 34. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976) (extending § 212(c) relief to deportable 
aliens regardless of whether they had voluntarily left the United States). 
 35. 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir.1976). 
 36. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 37. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1329–30 (citing Francis, 532 F.2d 268 at 272). 
 38. Id. at 1330 (citing In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 184 (B.I.A. 1984)). 
 39. Id. (quoting In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 184). 
 40. Id. at 1330–32. 
 41. Id. at 1333 (summarizing the approaches taken by the Second and Ninth Circuits).  
 42. In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728 (B.I.A. 2005). 
 43. Id.  
4
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are not statutory counterparts.44 
Following the BIA’ s decision, the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits all adopted the categorical approach.45 
The Second Circuit did not, however.46 It fashioned a broad offense-
based approach that requires immigration courts to inquire into the 
deportee’ s underlying crime to determine whether it could have a statutory 
counterpart.47 Essentially, the Second Circuit requires immigration courts 
to determine whether the petitioner’ s underlying crime could have been 
charged in a manner that would entitle him to relief.48 As noted by the 
court, this method substantially expands the number of eligible applicants, 
“open[ing] the door to a torrent of claims.”49  
The Ninth Circuit likewise disagreed, but found fault in both the 
categorical and offense-based approaches.50 Rather than expanding 
eligibility, however, it rejected the Francis expansion altogether and 
determined that § 212(c) relief is per se unavailable to deportees.51 It 
reasoned that Congress likely intended the initial distinction to encourage 
aliens to voluntarily leave the United States rather than be deported, 
thereby saving government resources.52 As De la Rosa noted, these legal 
distinctions have resulted in a three-way circuit split, leaving the court with 
a “menu of options.”53 
Amidst this legal turmoil, De la Rosa waited for the Eleventh Circuit to 
determine for the first time which standard it would require.54 He would 
not get the answer he sought.55 Refusing “to breathe further life” into what 
it described as a construct of judicial legislation, the court affirmed the 
holding of the BIA and unequivocally adopted the categorical standard for 
resolving the statutory counterpart test.56 De la Rosa would not benefit 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Id. (emphasis added). 
 45. National Immigrant Justice Center, 11th Cir. Adopts Categorical Approach, Rejects 
§ 212(c) Waiver for Sexual Abuse of a Minor, an Aggravated Felony, Aug. 20, 2009, 
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/litigationupdate/11thcircuit/11thcirdelarosa.html. 
 46. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Were we to approve of these other 
courts' formulaic approach-limiting ourselves only to the language in the relevant grounds of 
deportation and exclusion-we would be ignoring our precedent that requires us to examine the 
circumstances of the deportable alien, rather than the language Congress used to classify his or her 
status.”). 
 47. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d 1327,1333 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Carbone, 489 F.3d 
at 103). 
 48. Id. at 1333–34. 
 49. Id. at 1339 (quoting Abede v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009) (Clifton, J., 
concurring)). 
 50. Id. at 1334–35 (citing Abede, 554 F.3d at 1206).  
 51. See id. at 1335. 
 52. Id. at 1334–35. 
 53. Id. at 1335. 
 54. Id. at 1327 (“This case presents us with an issue of first impression in our circuit.”).  
 55. Id. at 1328. 
 56. Id. at 1340. 
5
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from the Attorney General’ s discretion—he would not even get the 
opportunity to plead his case for a waiver.57 
The basis for this rejection was twofold: a refusal to expand the Francis 
rule and a deference to the BIA’ s interpretation of its regulations. First, the 
Eleventh Circuit had parted ways with the Second Circuit’ s ongoing 
expansion of eligibility for § 212(c) waivers as far back as 1994.58 That 
year, the Eleventh Circuit decided Rodriguez-Padron v. INS,59 in which it 
“rejected any additional extension of the Francis rule.”60 In so holding, the 
court explicitly considered the Second Circuit’ s most recent extension of 
waiver relief—this time to deportees charged with illegal entry.61 In 
emphatic terms, the court concluded the Second Circuit’ s ongoing 
expansion of relief eligibility lacked any basis in the statutory text and also 
noted its concern with the Second Circuit’ s departure from the 
determinations of the Attorney General.62 
Expressing a rule of judicial restraint that would reappear  consistently 
in related Eleventh Circuit opinions, the Rodriguez-Padron court thereafter 
distinguished the Francis extension from the further expansion 
requested.63 The court explained that “[t]he former draws an implication 
from existing text, while the latter is a clear departure from plain statutory 
language.  In this context, we believe that a statute should be stretched only 
as far as necessary to prevent unconstitutionality.”64 Additionally, the court 
concluded that the contrary determinations of the Attorney General and 
other circuits should have been accorded some measure of deference.65  
These sentiments resurfaced in 2001 in Farquharson v. U.S. Attorney 
                                                                                                                     
 57. See id. at 1340. 
 58. See Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1994) (describing, in 
part, the difficulties that had arisen as a result of the multiple judicially-crafted extensions of 
§ 212(c) eligibility and therefore refusing to further extend the availability of such relief). 
 59. 13 F.3d 1455, 1457 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 60. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1338. 
 61. Rodriguez-Padron, 13 F.3d at 1459–61 (rejecting the rationale of Bedoya-Valencia v. 
INS, 6 F.3d 891 (2d Cir. 1993) and extending § 212 (c) relief to deportees charged with illegal 
entry). 
 62. Id. at 1459–61 (“The Second Circuit (unlike the Attorney General . . . and at least two 
other circuits) was untroubled by the lack of a basis for this extension in the statutory text, 
observing that ‘there has already been a considerable departure from the text’ in extending waiver 
availability to those deportable on analogous grounds.”). 
 63. Id. at 1459–60. 
 64. Id. at 1460. 
 65. Id. at 1460–61; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (requiring courts to accord deference to agency determinations in delineated 
circumstances). The Chevron doctrine requires courts reviewing agency interpretations of a statute 
to first determine “whether Congress has clearly spoken to the issue at hand.” J.C. Van Lierop III, 
Note, Post-9/11 Army Disability Decisions: Reinforcing Administrative Law Principles in Fitness 
and Disability Rating Determinations, 61 FLA. L. REV. 639, 651–52 (2009). If so, courts must yield 
to congressional intent, which can be gleaned from statutory text or, if ambiguous, legislative 
history. Id. Absent such intent, the Court concluded that implicit interpretative authority is reserved 
in the pertinent agency. Id. Courts must therefore defer to such interpretations that are reasonable 
and not “arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 652. 
6
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General when the Eleventh Circuit refused to expand § 212(c) relief to 
those charged with illegal-entry related crimes66—the very extension 
granted by the Second Circuit eight years prior.67  In reaffirming its refusal 
to broaden Francis, the court explicitly described its “aversion to 
‘ stretch[ing] [§ 212(c)] beyond its language’  . . . and observed that 
‘ further judicial redrafting would serve only to pull the statute further from 
its moorings in the legislative will.’ ”68 
Given such decidedly-critical precedent, the court’ s refusal to adopt the 
Second Circuit’ s most recent expansion—the offense-based standard—could 
certainly be expected.69 Other than Francis, from which the Eleventh 
Circuit has never receded, no extension of § 212(c) waiver relief has met 
the Eleventh Circuit’ s approval.70 
Standing alone, this reluctance to step beyond the line drawn by 
Francis would explain and support the court’ s most recent refusal to 
“breathe further life” into § 212(c) relief.71 It bears noting, however, that 
each of the described refusals was made in the absence of any codified 
standard.72 In 2004, the statutory counterpart test was codified at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1212.3(f)(5), which stated that “an application for relief under § 212(c) 
must be denied if ‘ [t]he alien is deportable under section 241 of the Act or 
removable under section 237 of the Act on a ground which does not have a 
statutory counterpart in section 212 of the Act.’ ”73 The following year, the 
BIA interpreted the newly codified test as requiring a categorical approach 
to determining eligibility.74  
Deference to this agency interpretation of the regulation is therefore the 
second rationale for the De la Rosa outcome.75 As described previously, 
the Eleventh Circuit has not refrained from criticizing a perceived lack of 
deference by the Second Circuit to BIA determinations.76 Such deference is 
required by the Chevron doctrine,77 which requires courts to defer to 
agency interpretations that are not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”78 Of course, this deference is not absolute.79 Courts 
                                                                                                                     
 66. 246 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 67. Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 897 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 68. De la Rosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 579 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(quoting Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1325). 
 69. Id. at 1338 (“In our view, we parted ways with the Second Circuit [long ago] . . . .”). 
 70. Id. (“Although we consistently signaled our view that any additional extension of 
§ 212(c) beyond Frances is ‘not constitutionally required,’ we stress that we have in no way 
abandoned our adoption of the equal protection rationale of Francis itself.”). 
 71. Id. at 1340. 
 72. See Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1322-23; Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1459–
61 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 73. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1332 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2008)). 
 74. Id. at 1332–33 (citing In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728 (BIA 2005)). 
 75. Id. at 1339–40. 
 76. Rodriguez-Padron, 13 F.3d at 1460–61. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Dustin G. Hall, Note, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our 
7
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cannot abdicate their responsibility to “say what the law is,” and thus have 
the right even under Chevron to review BIA interpretations to ensure they 
comply with congressional intent.80   
Undertaking this inquiry, the court concluded that the plain language of 
the statute supported a limited categorical inquiry and gave no indication 
that Congress intended the underlying crime for which a petitioner was 
convicted to play any role in the inquiry.81 In fact, the court found that to 
allow courts to look beyond the charged grounds of deportation to 
determine whether a criminal offense could have been treated as a crime of 
moral turpitude would greatly expand the role Congress assigned the 
judiciary in immigration cases.82  
The Third Circuit’ s rationale in Caroleo v. Gonzales upports the 
Eleventh Circuit’ s conclusion.83 That court opined that if Congress 
intended courts to investigate whether a charged crime had underlying 
attributes that could coincide with an eligible category, it plainly could 
have done so.84 The court identified 8 U.S.C. § 237, wherein Congress 
explicitly required that “courts look to an alien’ s underlying criminal 
conviction to determine eligibility” for removal, as an example.85 Noting 
the absence of similar language in the § 212(c) construct, the Third Circuit 
refused to credit the petitioner’ s argument that his conviction for 
attempted murder be considered a crime involving moral turpitude.86 
In addition to this textual distinction, the De la Rosa court noted that 
the practical effect of employing the offense-based standard sought by De 
la Rosa would be akin to sentencing a criminal defendant along the 
sentencing range required by the least serious crime with which he could 
have been charged—a concept the court considered clearly untenable.87 The 
court thus concluded the BIA’ s interpretation fell well within the scope of 
reasonableness and, therefore, required due deference.88 Affirming the 
decision of the BIA, the court declined to give De la Rosa the opportunity 
                                                                                                                     
Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 203 (2008) (explaining the Chevron doctrine’s two-step 
process). 
 79. David A. Karp, Comment, Setting the “Persecutor Bar” for Political Asylum After 
Negusie, 61 FLA. L. REV. 933, 935–36 (2009) (“The complexity of Negusie’s case, which presented 
questions of foreign affairs, international law, and Congress’ plenary immigration power, illustrates 
why courts so often ask the political branches to settle these types of policy issues.”). 
 80. Id.  
 81. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Caroleo v. 
Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 168 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
 82. Id. at 1339 (quoting Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 692 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(concluding alien convicted of criminal sexual abuse of a child was ineligible for relief)). 
 83. 476 F.3d at 164–68 (adhering to the categorical approach). 
 84. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1339 (citing Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 160–64, 168). 
 85. Id. (quoting Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 164). 
 86. Id. (citing Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 164–68). 
 87. Id. at 1339–40 (quoting Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 88. See id. at 1339. 
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on which he depended.89 
Though the Eleventh Circuit eventually ruled against him, De la Rosa 
had good cause to appeal. In the absence of controlling precedent, he 
sought to convince the court to adopt the Second Circuit’ s offense-based 
approach90—an approach under which he would be eligible for relief.91 
Practically speaking, he risked nothing with his challenge.92 If successful, 
however, he had much to gain: a possible waiver of deportation. 
Still, De la Rosa’ s gamble was a long shot. In each of its decisions 
regarding the eligibility of deportable aliens to § 212(c) relief, the Eleventh 
Circuit had exercised judicial restraint, refusing to cross beyond the 
Francis line.93 In De la Rosa, this would not change.94 Instead, the court 
reiterated its aversion to the judicial extension of a statute without 
sufficient constitutional justification and warned that even an initial 
extension does not empower courts to extend a statute ad infinitum.95 
Specfically, the court explained: 
When a rule, born of a series of ad hoc judicial extensions 
to a statute, no longer bears any passing resemblance to its 
parent legislation, that rule is a creature of judicial legislation. 
We decline to breathe further life into such a construct and 
hew to the maxim that courts are charged with adjudication, 
not legislation.96  
Without question, by electing to “guard against the temptation to 
cherry-pick those portions [of law] along the continuum that [it] might find 
appealing or convenient . . . ,” the Eleventh Circuit abided by Congress’  





                                                                                                                     
 89. Id. at 1340. 
 90. Id. at 1337. 
 91. See Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding to the BIA to 
determine whether  charges for sexual abuse of a minor necessarily constituted a crime involving 
moral turpitude). 
 92. Given the Eleventh Circuit’s ongoing affirmation of Francis, it is inconceivable that the 
court would elect to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s blanket prohibition. See De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 
1335, 1337 n.14. 
 93. Id. at 1337–38. 
 94. Id. at 1340. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
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